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COURT SHIELDS STATES IN SUITS ON AGE BIAS
Los Angeles Times
Wednesday, January 12, 2000
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court on Tuesday stripped
the nation's 5 million state workers--as well as
California's teachers and public school
employees--of federal protection against age
discrimination.
On a 5-4 vote, the court ruled that state
agencies, including public colleges, are shielded
from lawsuits filed by their workers under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
The decision throws out claims of age bias
in three lawsuits: one from professors and
librarians at Florida State University, a second
from a Florida prison guard and a third from
two instructors at an Alabama state college.
Once again, the court's conservative
majority showed itself determined to limit the
power of the national government and to
champion the states as independent sovereigns.
"Congress exceeded its authority," Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor said, when in 1974 it
gave state workers the same rights as private
sector employees to sue for damages if they are
victims of age discrimination. States, she said,
have a "sovereign immunity" that shields them
from such private lawsuits.
In California, public school districts are
treated as state agencies and, therefore, will
have the same legal immunity from age bias
suits.
"This is a terrible decision," said Michael
Simpson, assistant general counsel for the
National Education Assn., which represented
the Florida professors. "It turns the clock back
on civil rights and makes state workers into
second-class citizens."
Still, because California and other states
have strong laws against job discrimination,
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some experts predicted that the effect on their
teachers and others workers may be minimal.
"California is out ahead of the states and
the federal government on the protection of
employees' rights," said Los Angeles lawyer
Arthur F. Silbergeld.
But not all states extend such protections,
said Laurie McCann, an AARP lawyer. "If you
are in California, you are probably in good
shape. If you are a state trooper in Alabama,
you are not."
Unquestionably, the driving theme of the
court under Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
has become states' rights. In three rulings last
June, the court shielded states from having to
pay overtime to their workers and blocked
claims against state agencies for infringing
patents and trademarks.
Tuesday's opinion marked the first time the
Rehnquist majority has directly limited
Congress' power to remedy discrimination.
Also vulnerable now are the federal laws
that protect state workers with disabilities and
mandate a period of leave for workers with a
medical or family crisis. Even Title IX, the
landmark federal law that requires equal
funding for women's sports, could be
challenged as exceeding Congress' power, some
experts said.
From the nation's beginning, the balance of
power between the states and the national
government has been a recurring dispute.
Until the 1930s, Washington's power was
seen as under strict limits. For example, areas
such as crime, education and private business
were thought to be off-limits to federal
authorities. Even when notorious criminals
were on the loose, the FBI shied away until the
suspects had crossed state lines.
But the New Deal era greatly expanded the
reach of federal control over the economy. In
recent decades, federal authority has spread to
all aspects of American life, such as regulating
the workplace, the schools and the
environment.
Rehnquist, joined by the four other
conservative justices, has consciously tried to
move the law back to an earlier era.
Legal scholars differ on whether the recent
rulings of the Rehnquist court are a necessary
corrective or a reactionary retrenchment.
Pepperdine University law professor
Douglas W. Kmiec defends the court for trying
to preserve the balance set in the original
Constitution.
"These decisions are healthy for the
democratic process. They reflect a trust in local
governments and states to resolve their own
problems in their own ways," said Kmiec, a
former Reagan administration attorney. "Where
is it written that these questions have to be
elevated to the federal level?"
USC law professor Erwin Chemerinsky, a
sharp critic of the trend, responded by saying
that civil rights is a national issue, not a local
one.
"I thought it had been accepted over the
last 40 years that the federal government has a
special role in stopping discrimination," he said.
"This decision marks the first time they have
limited the ability to sue states for
discrimination."
Lawyers for the Florida and Alabama
professors argued that the 14th Amendment
gives Congress the power to enforce the age-
discrimination law against the states. Added
after the Civil War, the amendment says that
states may not deny persons the "equal
protection of the laws." Its last section says that
Congress "shall have the power to enforce by
appropriate legislation" this mandate of
equality.
But the Supreme Court concluded Tuesday
that an attack on age discrimination is not
appropriate. "States may discriminate on the
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basis of age," O'Connor said, unlike race and
gender discrimination, which are forbidden.
Her opinion (Kimel vs. Florida, 98-791)
was joined by Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. The four dissenters lambasted the
majority for "judicial activism" of the right.
In a remarkable rebuke to the majority,
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer
vowed that they would never go along with the
conservatives' doctrine announcing that states
have a "sovereign immunity" from federal laws.
"This kind of judicial activism ...
represents such a radical departure of the
proper role of this court that it should be
opposed whenever the opportunity arises,"
wrote Stevens for the dissenters.
The Rehnquist majority says that the
doctrine of "state sovereign immunity" comes
from the 11th Amendment, which says that the
power of federal courts "shall not be construed
to extend to any law suit commenced against
one of the United States by a citizen of another
state."
But Stevens said the plain words of the
11th Amendment show that it has nothing to
do with this case. Professor J. Daniel Kimel, the
lead plaintiff, is suing his own state of Florida,
not another state.
The victory for the states was announced in
the courtroom moments before oral arguments
began in a major case that pits women's rights
against states' rights.
Congress passed the Violence Against
Women Act in 1994 in response to complaints
that cases of date rape and spousal abuse often
went unprosecuted by the states. The new law
said that women have a right to be free of
"gender-motivated violence" and it gave victims
of sexual assaults a right to sue their assailants
in federal court.
A test case soon arose when a Virginia
Tech freshman, Christy Brzonkala, said that she
was raped in a dormitory room by Antonio
Morrison, a star linebacker. When the university
reinstated Morrison to play football, despite her
complaint, she sued him.
But before her claim could be heard, a
conservative U.S. appeals court struck down
the law as unconstitutional.
All eyes were on Justice O'Connor during
the oral argument, since she is assumed to hold
the deciding vote. A former Arizona state
legislator and appointee of President Reagan,
she has joined the five-member majority that
champions states' rights.
In cases involving women's rights, however,
she has often switched sides and helped form a
liberal majority. In June, for example, she cast
the deciding fifth vote to rule that schools and
colleges can be sued if their officials ignore
reports of a student being sexually harassed by
another student.
In her only comments Tuesday, O'Connor
sounded troubled by the reach of the Violence
Against Women Act.
If federal lawmakers are free to intervene
whenever they detect gender bias, "presumably
Congress could intervene with a federal law on
alimony and child custody," she commented.
But a lawyer for the NOW Legal Defense
Fund, representing Brzonkala, pointed out that
most state officials welcomed the women's
right law, not seeing it as a threat or intrusion.
Attorneys general from 36 states, including
California's Bill Lockyer, filed a brief urging the
court to uphold the law.
Only the state of Alabama asked the justices
to strike down the law on states' rights grounds.
A ruling in the case (Brzonkala vs.
Morrison, 99-29) can be expected in several
months.
Copyright C 2000 Times Mirror Company
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COURT CURBS SUIT BY STATE WORKERS
Continuing A Pattern, 5-4 Ruling Bars Clains ofAge Bias Under
Federal Law
The Washington Post
Wednesday, January 12,2000
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
state workers who were discriminated against
because of their age cannot sue under federal
law, in a sharply divided opinion that continues
the court's effort to curtail congressional power
and could have repercussions for thousands of
state employees nationwide.
By a 5 to 4 vote along familiar lines, the
justices said Congress lacked the authority to
make states liable for the age discrimination
complaints of their workers. The ruling was a
defeat for the nation's 5 million state employees
and a variety of advocates for older and
disadvantaged workers who had been part of
the case. While those workers can still seek
redress in state courts, the laws and
enforcement vary widely around the country.
"The decision sends a message that if age
discrimination is a civil right at all, it's a second-
class right," declared AARP lawyer Laurie
McCann.
But a spokesman for the Florida Board of
Regents, which had been sued by a group of
older professors, noted that the ruling still
permits state workers who face discrimination
to sue under the various state anti-bias laws.
"The right place for this is with the states,"
Keith Goldschmidt said.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor said that because an individual's age
has not been granted the constitutional
protection that race and sex have, Congress had
insufficient grounds to override states' usual
immunity from federal lawsuits. "Older persons
... unlike those who suffer discrimination on
the basis of race or gender, have not been
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment," O'Connor wrote.
Overall, the decision marked another stride
in the court's quest to diminish the reach of
Congress. It was announced, coincidentally, just
minutes before the court heard arguments in
another, more closely watched dispute over
federal authority--concerning the 1994 Violence
Against Women Act that allows women who
have been sexually assaulted to sue their
attackers in federal court.
Joining O'Connor in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents were Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. Dissenting
were Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven G.
Breyer. That is the same 5 to 4 split that
emerged in a series of recent decisions limiting
individuals' ability to sue for violations of
federal law and on which yesterday's ruling was
based.
Writing for the dissenters, Stevens attacked
the majority's larger effort and asserted that, in
the age discrimination dispute, Congress was
validly overriding the normal protections given
states in allowing workers to sue under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which
protects workers 40 and older.
"It is ... clear to me that if Congress has
the power to create the federal rights that these
[older workers] are asserting, it must also have
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the power to give the federal courts jurisdiction
to remedy violations of those rights," Stevens
wrote.
The case arose from a trio of lawsuits: three
dozen professors and librarians at Florida state
universities who claimed they were unfairly
denied raises because they were over 40; a
guard at a Florida prison who said he lost out
on a promotion because of his age; and two
professors, age 57 and 58, at an Alabama state
school who said they were denied promotions
and pay. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit had ruled that the states could not
be sued.
The Justice Department sided with the
workers, arguing that the 14th Amendment
gives Congress the power to enforce equal
protection of the laws.
But the high court rejected those grounds,
effectively saying that age cases are different
from the traditional civil rights relating to race,
national origin and sex. The court said that
because state employers may differentiate
among workers based on age in many
situations, it is too extreme to hold them
financially responsible in federal court for such
decisions. The justices noted that states may
favor younger workers if there is a legitimate
reason to do so.
"Old age," O'Connor wrote, "does not
define a discrete and insular minority because
all persons, if they live out their normal life
spans, will experience it." She also emphasized
that lawmakers never made any findings that
age discrimination among state employers was a
problem: "Congress failed to identify a
widespread pattern of age discrimination by the
states."
O'Connor added in the end that state
workers who face discrimination have other
avenues of seeking retribution. "State
employees are protected by states' age
discrimination statutes, and may recover money
damages from their state employers, in almost
every state of the union."
Some employment lawyers said the court's
rationale could have ramifications in other anti-
discrimination cases because, in determining
whether Congress could override states' 11th
Amendment immunity, the court drew a line
between characteristics that have robust
constitutional protection and all others.
The Americans With Disabilities Act
includes a similar provision for federal lawsuits
against state employers who discriminate on the
job and in state services. But the justices have
accorded age and disability a lesser degree of
constitutional protection than race and sex bias
claims.
"This should be of grave concern," said
Georgetown University law professor Chai
Feldblum, who helped draft the ADA. "The
question is whether there is enough evidence of
state discrimination in the record [for example]
of state police departments not handling deaf
people, the mentally retarded, very well. It is a
close question."
Copyright 0 2000 The Washington Post
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Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners
V.
Charlie CONDON, Attorney General of South Carolina, et al.
No. 98-1464
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided January 12, 2000
JUSTICES UPHOLD BAN ON STATES' SALES OF DRIVERS' LICENSE
INFORMATION
The New York Times
Thursday, Jan uary 13, 2000
The Supreme Court today upheld a federal
law that bars states from selling their databases
of personal information on licensed drivers and
automobile owners.
States had challenged the law in courts
around the country, and the unanimous
decision was a rare federal victory in the
ongoing battle at the court over federal versus
state authority. Recent decisions, including one
yesterday that states are immune from suits
under the federal law against age discrimination,
have curbed Congressional authority and
upheld state prerogatives in a variety of
contexts.
States were earning millions of dollars a
year by selling drivers' personal information to
direct marketers, charities, political campaigns
and various commercial interests until Congress
intervened in 1994 by passing the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act.
Sometimes the information also fell into the
hands of stalkers or, in the case of abortion
clinics, of people who wanted to track down
the identity of doctors and patients. The
Greenhouse
murder of an actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, by a
man who obtained her unlisted address from
California motor vehicle records helped spur
passage of the law, which generally requires
states to safeguard the privacy of personal
information contained in the records of drivers
who have not consented to disclosure. There
are exceptions in the law for records needed for
law enforcement, safety and certain other
purposes.
While there were substantial privacy
interests at stake in the fate of the statute,
which a federal appeals court had declared
unconstitutional in a suit brought by South
Carolina, the court today did not address either
the policy behind the law or the privacy issue in
general.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's
unusually brief nine-page opinion was framed
entirely in terms of federalism: whether
Congress had the constitutional authority to
pass the law, and whether the law infringed on
state prerogatives.
As to Congressional authority, the chief
justice said the law fit comfortably within the
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power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce because the information was "an
article of commerce" in the context of the
statute and "its sale or release into the interstate
stream of business is sufficient to support
Congressional regulation."
As to state prerogatives, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said the concerns that had led the
court recently to invalidate a provision of the
Brady gun control law and of a nuclear waste
disposal law were simply inapplicable. He said
that unlike those statutes, which required state
officials to assist in federal law enforcement,
and state legislatures to deal with radioactive
waste in particular ways, the Drivers Privacy
Protection Act was a straightforward federal
regulation of state activity that raised no
federalism issues.
In effect, the court said the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
made a category error in treating the driver
privacy law as one that raised states' rights
concerns.
The law "does not require the states in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens," the chief justice said, adding, "It does
not require the South Carolina Legislature to
enact any laws or regulations, and it does not
require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating
private individuals."
Chief Justice Rehnquist said the law simply
"regulates the states as the owners of
databases," a permissible federal role.
When the case was argued in November,
several justices expressed their concern to
Attorney General Charlie Condon of South
Carolina that under the state's theory, states
could not be required to adhere to federal food
and drug laws or other garden-variety federal
regulations. Even in its tilt toward the states in
its recent series of federalism decisions, the
court has not gone that far.
The court's view of the case, Reno v.
Condon, No. 98-1464, permitted it to avoid
confronting the most provocative aspect of the
Fourth Circuit's 1998 ruling, that the federal
government could regulate the states only by
means of "generally applicable" laws. Because
only states issue drivers' licenses, the law
impermissibly singled out the states for
regulation, the appeals court ruled.
Chief Justice Rehnquist said that because
the law also regulated use of the information by
"private resellers or redisclosers," it was in fact
a generally applicable law, and there was no
reason to rule on the validity of the appeals
court's approach. To this degree, the decision
today did not so much resolve an important
federalism issue as defer the debate.
States were not the only ones to object to
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act. A brief filed
on South Carolina's behalf by the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press and the
American Society of Newspaper Editors told
the court that the law ignored the broad public
interest in access to information that is a "basic
tool for reporting." For example, the brief said,
The Miami Herald used drivers' records in 1991
to disclose that 70,000 people in South Florida
had been caught driving with suspended
licenses.
On the other side, the Feminist Majority
Foundation, which filed a brief in support of
the law on behalf of abortion clinics and
victims of domestic violence, said the decision
was an important victory. Eleanor Smeal, the
group's president, said the decision "will save
the lives of both abortion providers and women
targeted by stalkers."
Copyright D 2000 The New York Times
Company
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COURT BACKS PRIVACY FOR DATA ON DRIVERS
The Washington Post
Thursday, January 13, 2000
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously
yesterday that states can be barred from
disclosing the personal information drivers
provide to obtain a license, in a surprising
decision immediately extolled by privacy
activists and civil libertarians.
Deciding a closely watched dispute that
particularly evoked privacy fears in today's
world of instant electronic data, the justices
upheld a federal law that forbids states from
selling addresses, telephone numbers and other
information that drivers put on license
applications.
The ruling was an unexpected departure
from the court's recent string of rejections of
federal laws that touch on state activities. But
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist emphasized
how this law was different and encroached far
less on state authority.
Women's groups and civil libertarians
praised the decision for preserving a 1994 law
that they say keeps intimate information from
stalkers and harassers. Privacy advocates and
members of the direct-marketing industry
agreed the ruling opens the way for Congress to
pass similar laws restricting the interstate sale of
records on land ownership, housing sales,
occupational and recreational licenses and an
array of other information.
That could mean that even as the details of
people's lives become more avidly collected by
marketers and more readily available through
the Internet, widespread access will not go
unchecked. "It's clearly a message to the states
they're going to have to be much more careful,"
said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center.
Yesterday was a full and dramatic day at the
nation's highest court, as the justices ruled in
four other cases--from criminal law to
environmental protections--and heard
arguments on grandparents' visitation rights.
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA) six years ago, motivated
in part by the death of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer, who was killed at her California
home by a stalker who had traced her address
through the motor vehicles division.
More broadly, lawmakers were addressing
public concerns about telemarketers, the media
and others with access to the vast array of
personal information in the records of state
motor vehicle departments. Congress found
that many states were making millions of
dollars a year selling the information, which can
include Social Security numbers, medical
information and photographs.
The DPPA bars states from disclosing such
personal information without drivers' consent.
There are exceptions in the law for matters of
motor vehicle and driver safety, theft, and
manufacturers' product recalls--and one of the
states' complaints was that the statute was
difficult to administer.
In yesterday's case, South Carolina, backed
by a dozen other states, challenged the law as
an unconstitutional encroachment on its
business; the state had a policy making DMV
records available to anyone who filled out a
form and paid the requisite fees. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit agreed,
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saying the law wrongly forced states to
administer a federal regulation and violated
federalism principles.
But in reversing the Richmond-based 4th
Circuit yesterday, the high court emphasized
that, unlike past laws ruled unconstitutional, the
privacy statute wasn't telling states to pass
specific legislation or to regulate their citizens in
particular ways.
In a relatively brief 10-page opinion in
Reno v. Condon that drew no dissent or
concurring statements, Rehnquist wrote that
the law flowed from Congress's authority to
regulate interstate commerce.
Addressing the larger question about the
federal-state boundary, Rehnquist explained
how the act differs from two statutes--
concerning handgun purchase waiting periods
and environmental rules--struck down in the
1990s. "The DPPA regulates the states as
owners of databases. It does not require the
South Carolina legislature to enact any laws or
regulations, and it does not require state
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal
statutes regulating private individuals."
The court's ruling turned on an analysis of
Congress's interstate commerce powers, but
most of the reaction yesterday addressed larger
privacy questions. Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-
Calif.), a sponsor of the law, said the decision
permits Congress to protect "information that
could be used to harm our citizens."
Eleanor Smeal, president of the Feminist
Majority Foundation, noted that some
antiabortion protesters have tracked physicians
and their patients through motor vehicle
information. "This Supreme Court decision will
save the lives of both abortion providers and
women targeted by stalkers," she said.
But South Carolina Attorney General
Charles Condon declared, "A one-size-fits-none
attempt by the federal government to protect
privacy will not work."
And H. Robert Wientzen, president of the
Direct Marketing Association, expressed
concerns that important business information
on which his group's members rely will dry up.
He said the association will ask Congress to
hold hearings on the matter.
In a separate ruling yesterday, the court,
voting 7 to 2, upheld citizen groups' right to sue
alleged polluters under the Clean Water Act
even though any financial damages awarded
would be paid to the federal government.
"This is a rare victory for the environment
from the Supreme Court and a dramatic
reversal of the trend of Supreme Court
decisions on citizens' rights to sue under
environmental laws," John Echeveria, director
of the Environmental Policy Project at
Georgetown Law Center, said of the ruling in
Friends of the Earth vs. Laidlaw Environmental
Services.
Copyright C 2000 The Washington Post
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Last Term:
United States
V.
Antonio J. MORRISON, et al.
Christy BRZONKALA
V.
Antonio J. MORRISON, eta.
Nos. 99-5 and 99-29
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided, May 15, 2000
WOMEN CAN'T SUE RAPISTS, COURT SAYS; JUSTICES STRIKE
DOWN KEY PART OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, May 16,2000,
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - Putting strict new limits
on Congress' power to protect civil rights and
crime victims, the Supreme Court struck down
yesterday a key provision of a federal law that
gave women who have been raped the right to
sue their attackers.
The court ruled, by a 5-4 vote, that the
1994 law intruded too deeply into the state and
local domain. "The Constitution," Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist wrote, "requires a
distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local."
The court rejected the theory of the law's
supporters that sexual violence against women
costs the economy billions of dollars, making it
a national issue for Congress to address. If that
theory were valid, Rehnquist said, it "would
allow Congress to regulate any crime."
As if to warn Congress against exceeding
its powers in an effort to solve social problems,
the chief justice reminded lawmakers that the
court "is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution" as it governs national
legislative power.
The decision came as a modem echo of
the fight, more than six decades ago, over a
series of Supreme Court decisions that struck
down wide-ranging New Deal laws passed by
Congress to deal with the Depression.
That fight led President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to propose to "pack" the court with
sympathetic justices. His court-packing plan
died after the court switched positions and
began upholding New Deal laws.
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Yesterday, in nullifying a key portion of the
Violence Against Women Act, the court
offered two explanations.
First, it said, because sexual violence
against women is a problem caused by private
individuals and is ordinarily handled by state
and local police, Congress may not create new
federal penalties for assailants.
Second, the majority said, Congress cannot
adopt remedies for such assaults on the theory
that it is regulating the economic effects of
sexual violence on women across the nation.
Such violence, it said, is not an economic
activity.
To the young woman who used the 1994
law to sue for damages in an alleged rape by
two college football players, Rehnquist said:
"No civilized system of justice could fail to
provide her a remedy" if her charge was true.
But, Rehnquist added, "Under our federal
system, that remedy must be provided by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the
United States."
The ruling marked the third time in three
years that the court has found a federal civil
rights law unconstitutional. The decision was
the latest in a string of 5-4 decisions that have
sought to revitalize states' rights at the expense
of Congress.
Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., a Delaware
Democrat who was the principal author of the
legislation that was struck down yesterday, said:
"This is a big-deal decision; it is pretty sweeping
in my view." He said the ruling embraced a
view of the court's authority that "I thought we
did away with in the New Deal."
Part of his concern, Biden said, is that
because the ruling is based on "constitutional
principle," there is no way Congress can
overcome it by passing laws. "This can only be
taken care of by changing the makeup of the
court," and that makes it an issue for this year's
presidential election, the senator said.
Michael E. Rosman, general counsel of the
conservative Center for Individual Rights, who
led the fight against allowing female victims of
sex-based violence to sue in federal court, said:
"This is a good day for the Constitution,"
showing that "even popular and well-
intentioned laws" can go astray constitutionally.
Christy Brzonkala, the Fairfax, Va., woman
who sought to sue under the law for the sexual
assault she said occurred during her first weeks
as a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
commonly called Virginia Tech, was not
available for comment on the ruling, her
attorneys said. She quit the university and, now
23, is working in Washington as a waitress.
Neither of the men she accused was
prosecuted in Virginia. A suspension ordered
by university officials for one of them was
overturned in an appeal to a more senior
Virginia Tech official.
Brzonkala received $75,000 under a
settlement in a separate lawsuit against Virginia
Tech. She settled that case under a different
federal law, which was not available for her
claims against the football players.
Kathryn J. Rodgers, general counsel of the
NOW Legal Defense Fund, a women's rights
group that represented Brzonkala, called the
ruling "a step backward for all civil rights law."
With the ruling, Rodgers added, "The court
is in effect writing women out of the federal
Constitution, wishing us luck and sending us to
the states for justice."
A conservative advocacy group, the
Institute for Justice, countered that the case
"was never about women's rights. It was about
whether there are limits to Congress' power
under the Constitution."
The civil rights lawsuit provision that the
justices overturned yesterday was only one part
of the Violence Against Women Act, and it was
the only part at issue before the court. The
court had refused earlier to hear a constitutional
challenge to a separate part of the law that
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makes it a crime to travel across state borders
to connit violence against women.
Congress, in passing the law, said that "all
persons within the U.S. shall have the right to
be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender." It allowed the victims of such violence
to sue their assailants for damages in federal
court.
It is unclear how many such lawsuits have
been filed since the law was passed in 1994. But
women's rights groups who sued on behalf of
Brzonkala said they have had scores of inquiries
from lawyers considering such lawsuits.
The law provided the civil rights remedy
after a four-year congressional investigation
concluded that state and local prosecutors and
police were not doing enough to stop domestic
violence and other forms of gender-based
crimes. The inquiry also found that such
violence was costing the economy billions in
lost work time and in medical expenses.
Yesterday's ruling was supported by the
bloc of five justices who have joined in earlier
decisions that have bolstered states' rights: the
chief justice and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas.
The dissenters, as before, were Justices
Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens.
Souter, in one of two opinions by
dissenters, said the ruling was "a revival of
similar efforts that led to near-tragedy for the
Court" in the 1930s. He said the decision
rejected the view of the Constitution's authors
that Congress, not the courts, "should mediate
between state and national interests.
Copyright C 2000 The Baltimore Sun
Company
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HIGH COURT REJECTS U.S. LAW ALLOWING CIVIL SUITS IN RAPES
Ruling:Justices Decide, 5 to 4, that Congress Overstepped Its Authority in Allowing Victims to
Sue. Action Appears to Doom Other Federal Hate-Crime Statutes.
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, May 16,2000
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court, rejecting the notion of
national laws against "hate crimes," struck
down a federal measure Monday that gave
battered spouses and victims of rape and other
sexual violence a right to sue their attackers.
The 5-4 ruling is the latest in which the
court's conservative majority has narrowed the
federal government's power--including over
civil rights.
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994
is unconstitutional, the court declared, because
the federal government has no right to regulate
a private act, such as rape, that is neither part of
interstate commerce nor caused by state
officials.
Congress has no power over
"noneconomic, violent criminal conduct" that
does not cross state lines, said Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist. "The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local."
The decision throws out a lawsuit brought
by a former Virginia Tech student who says
that as a university freshman she was raped in a
dormitory room by a football star.
After Christy Brzonkala reported the
incident to school officials, a hearing was held,
and the player, Tony Morrison, was suspended.
Prior to the fall football season, however,
school officials reversed the suspension, and
local prosecutors brought no charges in the
case. Her lawsuit against the player became a
test case of the new law.
States can enact hate crime laws, but
Rehnquist's reasoning appears to doom national
laws targeted at crimes against blacks, gays,
Jews, Muslims or ethnic nuinorities, legal
experts agreed.
A pending hate crime bill on Capitol Hill
would give federal prosecutors the option of
intervening in crimes that were allegedly
motivated by the victim's sexual orientation,
gender or disability. Despite its popularity, the
legislation has stalled in the House.
USC law professor Erwin Chemerinsky
said, "A hate crimes law for gays would be very
difficult to justify under the Brzonkala
decision." Although anti-discrimination laws in
the workplace are secure because they are seen
as regulations of commercial activity, he said,
"beyond the workplace, it's too hard to find the
constitutional basis for federal regulation."
In the past, federal authorities have avoided
prosecuting even sensational hate crimes unless
they could find some link to interstate activity.
Reaction to Ruling Along Party Lines
The court's strict limit on federal authority
also calls into question some environmental
laws such as the Endangered Species Act. Some
critics have suggested Congress has no power
to protect a threatened animal or plant that
lives in only one state and has no effect on
interstate commerce.
Reaction to Monday's ruling split along
party lines.
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Democratic leaders and women's rights
activists decried the decision as a step backward
for the nation. Republicans and conservative
activists praised the court for restraining federal
authority.
President Clinton said he was "deeply
disappointed" by the court's decision striking
down a rape victim's right to bring a federal
civil damages suit. He signed the bill into law as
part of the 1994 crime control act. He noted,
however, that federal prosecutors still can bring
criminal charges against stalkers who cross state
lines.
Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), the law's
sponsor, called the decision "extremely
troublesome." In a phone interview, he said the
conservative court is returning to the thinking
of the "pre-New Deal era." Prior to 1937, the
aggressively conservative court struck down
federal measures such as minimum wage and
child labor laws on the theory that they
exceeded Congress' power.
"These folks are judicial activists," Biden
said of Rehnquist's majority. "They are saying
the federal courts are going to make these
judgments, not Congress."
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) said, "The restoration
of federalism scrutiny in our federal courts is a
welcome development in the law. The
Constitution reserves to the states the 'ordinary
administration of criminal and civil justice,' " he
said, quoting Alexander Hamilton.
"This is a good day for the Constitution,"
added Michael Rosman, general counsel for the
Center for Individual Rights. He represented
Tony Morrison, the Virginia Tech football
player who was sued. "The outcome indicates
that even popular and well-intentioned laws
cannot be sustained by political pressure alone,"
Rosman said.
In a sense, Monday's outcome comes as no
surprise. The court has split into two factions
on these issues.
Five members of the court--Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas--
strongly support states' rights and limits on
federal power.
The four dissenters take a nationalist view
and say Congress has broad power to regulate
in the national interest. They are Justices John
Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
On Jan. 11, the same 5-4 split was on
display when the court stripped the nation's five
million state workers and public college
professors of the right to sue their employers
for age discrimination. Although the federal
Age Discrimination Act allowed such suits,
states have a "sovereign immunity" that shields
them, the conservative majority said.
On the same day that ruling was
announced, the court heard arguments in the
combined cases of U.S. vs. Morrison, 99-5, and
Brzonkala vs. Morrison. Monday's decision saw
the same line-up.
Since the 1960s, many Americans may have
assumed federal government has special power
over matters of discrimination and civil rights.
This is not so clear anymore. Under Rehnquist,
the court has revived an older view of the
Constitution and its separation of powers.
The original Constitution says Congress
"shall have the power to regulate commerce ...
among the several states." Meanwhile, the 14th
Amendment, added after the Civil War, says
Congress can enforce the guarantee of "equal
protection of laws" in the states.
Interstate Commerce an Issue in Ruling
Clinton administration lawyers cited both
provisions as defenses of the Violence Against
Women Act, but both were rejected.
The 14th Amendment prohibits
discrimination by state officials only, Rehnquist
said. The alleged rape in this case was a private
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act, and therefore is outside the territory
covered by the 14th Amendment, he said.
The real debate focused on the reach of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
For most of the 20th century, the court gave a
liberal interpretation to this provision that
allowed federal regulation of the workplace, the
environment and civil rights.
The landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which barred discrimination against blacks in
jobs, hotels and other public businesses, was
upheld by the Supreme Court as a regulation of
interstate commerce. But more recently, the
Rehnquist majority has said it will not allow
Congress to regulate virtually anything on the
theory that it might affect commerce.
In 1995, the 5-4 majority struck down a law
that made it a federal crime to have a gun near a
school. Mere gun possession is not part of
interstate commerce, Rehnquist said then in the
case of U.S. vs. Lopez.
When considering the Violence Against
Women Act, Congress tried too mightily to
build a record to show that gender crimes affect
interstate commerce. It held hearings and
issued reports that estimated, for example, that
gender-motivated violence costs the economy $
5 billion to $ 10 billion per year. This includes
everything from medical costs for injuries to
battered women to jobs not taken by women
for fear of crime.
But Rehnquist dismissed all this as far-
fetched.
"Gender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity," he wrote. "Indeed, if Congress may
regulate this , it would be able to regulate
murder or any other type of violence."
This expansion would not be faithful to the
original Constitution, he said. There, "the
Founders denied the National government and
reposed in the States .. . the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of its victims," he
said.
Copyright C 2000 Times Mirror Company
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UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF TRUSTEES
v. GARRETT
Is the Writing on the Wall?: The ADA Could Be Next in the Supreme Court's March
Against Congress
Meredith Lugo*
Do state employees have the same rights as other workers? Or when it comes to
employment discrimination are they effectively secondclass citizens? They are surely
beginning to feel that way as recent Supreme Court decisions have systematically stripped
away their rights to sue their employer for redress for federal statutory violations. The
decisions have come in the wake of a states' rights revolution that has been sweeping the
high Court in recent years. In a trend for which the conservative majority of the Court has
been criticized for being judicial activists, five justices have consistently voted to curtail the
power of Congress to adopt laws governing the states. Gartt represents the most recent
battlefield in this revolution, as the Supreme Court will decide whether state employees may
sue their state for monetary damages based on claims of discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The Court will hear a consolidation of two cases filed by employees of the state of
Alabama. Patricia Garrett, director of nursing for women at the University of Alabama
Hospital, had been employed by the state for seventeen years when she was diagnosed with
breast cancer. In her suit filed in 1997 she alleges that her supervisor made negative
comments regarding her disease and threatened her with the loss of her job if she took a
leave of absence. She was demoted to a position with a lower salary when she was forced to
take four months of unpaid leave to undergo cancer treatment. Milton Ash, a security officer
with the state Department of Youth Services since 1993 and a sufferer of severe asthma,
alleges the Department failed to enforce its no-smoking policy where he worked and illegally
discriminated against him after he complained to a federal agency about their failure.
Gamtt reaches the Supreme Court from the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether
states retain their immunity, granted by the Eleventh Amendment, from suit by private
citizens despite Congress' attempt to abrogate such immunity with the ADA. The Eleventh
Circuit, in a decision controlled by its earlier holding in 1imel, a case which involved both the
ADA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), held that Congress had
successfully authorized suits by private citizens.
In a series of cases spanning the last few terms, the Supreme Court has become
increasingly explicit in the requirements that must be satisfied before Congress may remove
state sovereign immunity. Congress must provide a clear legislative statement of its intent to
so abrogate, and be acting under the enforcement power granted it by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 1996). The use of Section 5 power
is limited to those actions which are remedial, not substantive, and the Court insists upon a
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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proportionality between the injury Congress is seeking to prevent and the scope of the
legislation it has passed in response (City ofBoerne v. Flores, 1997). The Court has strictly
construed this requirement, demanding that Congress identify a pattern of widespread,
persistent discrimination to justify its use of Section 5 power (Florida Prepaid Postseconday Ed.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 1999; KImel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 2000). The central issue
in Gamt will thus be whether the Congressional record regarding the ADA illustrates such a
history of discrimination by the states against the disabled.
In its holding in Kimel the Eleventh Circuit found that Congress had expressly
referred to the disabled as a "discrete and insular minority" "subject to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment," classic equal protection language. It obviously remains to be
seen whether the Supreme Court will agree with this assessment. However, the Court's
decision this past term reversing the Eleventh Circuit's holding regarding the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in Kimel does not bode well for Garrett and Ash. The
Supreme Court held that state workers have no federal protection against age discrimination
because Congress lacked the authority to impose liability on the states without their consent.
Opposing the federalism revolution stands a now-familiar quartet of dissent Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg) committed to halting what they contend is the
majority's misguided dismantling of fundamental principles of American government. The
outcome of Gartt may represent their long-awaited triumph, but it seems more likely that it
will shed further doubt upon the future of Congressional regulation of state government
activity.
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99-1240 University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees v. Garrett
Ruling below (11'h Cir., 193 F.3d 1214, 9 A.D. Cas. 1635):
States are not immune from suits brought by state employees under either Americans with
Disabilities Act or Section 504 of 1973 Rehabilitation Act.
Question presented: Does 11 th Amendment bar suits by private citizens in federal court
under Americans with Disabilities Act against nonconsenting states?
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Patricia GARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
The UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant-Appellee,
The United States of America, Intervenor
Milton Ash, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Alabama Department of Youth Services, Defendant-Appellee
The United States of America, Intervenor
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.
Decided October 26, 1999
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:
These two consolidated cases appeal the
grant of summary judgments to two
defendant Alabama state agencies on the
ground of sovereign immunity. They raise
the question that is being litigated in
various jurisdictions of whether a state is
immune from suits by state employees
asserting rights under certain federal laws.
The three statutes here are: the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213; Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Family
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Following recent
precedent in this Circuit, we hold that the
state is not immune from suit under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act and reverse
the judgments of the district court against
plaintiffs Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash
as to those two statutes and remand the
two cases for further proceedings. ***
Although generally called Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which amendment
simply bars a federal court from hearing
claims against a state by a citizen of
another state,2 it has long been recognized
that each state is a sovereign entity in our
federal system and is not amenable to suit
by an individual without its consent. See
Seminole Tribe of Florda v. Florida*** and
Hans v. Louisiana***.
Under certain circumstances, however, the
United States Congress can pass laws
which give individual citizens a right of
action in federal court against an
unconsenting state. Those circumstances
require first, that "Congress has
'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to
abrogate the immunity,"' which "must be
obvious from 'a clear legislative
statement,"' and second, that Congress
has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of
power." Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.***
2The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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So far, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress can abrogate state immunity
only when it acts pursuant to section 5,
the enforcement provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 5 5.
The Court has held that Congress does
not have authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity when it acted only
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida ***.
This frames the issue in this field of
developing law: were these three statutes
passed with the unequivocal and clear
intent to give individuals a right of action
against a state, and do these statutes
reflect a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has laid out a few
guidelines in recent cases. In City ofBoerne
v. Flores, *** the Court struck down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA) ***, an act that Congress
purportedly passed pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers, and in direct response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Emplqyment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith ***. In Smith, the Court had held
that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not require states to
justify by a compelling interest generally
applicable, neutral laws that coincidentally
burden religious practices. *** In direct
response to Smith, Congress passed
RFRA, which required all laws that
burden a group's religion, even neutral
laws of general applicability, to be
narrowly tailored and justified by a
compelling interest. *** In striking down
RFRA, the Supreme Court warned that
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, not to define the
substance of the amendment, so that
Congress' power is remedial in nature.
To qualify as remedial, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."***
In Florida Prepaid Postseconday Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank ***, a
patentee brought an action against a state
agency alleging infringement of a patented
apparatus and method for administering
college investment programs. The Court
held that the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act could
not be sustained under the City ofBoerne
analysis as legislation enacted to enforce
any guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. *** In looking at whether
the Patent Remedy Act was remedial or
preventive legislation, the Court stated,
"we must first identify the Fourteenth
Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that
Congress intended to remedy, guided by
the principle that the propriety of § 5
legislation 'must be judged with reference
to the historical experience ... it reflects."'
*** The Court then looked to the
legislative history to see if there was
evidence of a pattern of constitutional
violations perpetrated by the states, such
as there were in the voting rights cases,
and found none. The Court noted that
Congress barely considered the availability
and constitutional adequacy of state law
remedies. The Court noted that while the
"lack of support in the legislative record is
not determinative ... identifying the
targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still
a critical part of our 5 5 calculus " **
The Court said that the record offered
only "scant support for Congress'
conclusion that states were depriving
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patent owners of property without due
process of law by pleading sovereign
immunity in federal court patent actions."
With these guidelines in mind, we
consider each of the acts at issue in this
case.
I. The ADA
Congress having unequivocally expressed
its intent for the ADA to abrogate
sovereign immunity, *** (A State shall not
be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from an action in Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction for a
violation of [the ADA]."), this Court in
Kimel v. State Bd. of Regents *** has already
held that the ADA is a valid exercise of
the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the
states do not have sovereign immunity
from claims brought under the ADA. We
note that Kimel reversed a district court
decision, and was decided by our Court
after the district court had made its
determination in this case. We, of course,
are bound by the decision of the Court in
Kimel. *** We note also that certiorari has
been granted in Kimel and any resulting
decision of the Supreme Court will
probably catch up with this case before a
final determination of the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims.
We, therefore, reverse the summary
judgment entered for the University of
Alabama at Birmingham Board of
Trustees and against Patricia Garrett on
her ADA claim ***, and the summary
judgment for the Alabama Department of
Youth Services and against Milton Ash on
his ADA claim ***, and remand for
further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART AND REMANDED.
365
COURT TO CLARIFY DISABILITIES ACT
AP Online
Monday, April 17,2000
Richard Careb, Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) -
Stepping back into a states' right battle over
a key federal anti-bias law, the Supreme Court
today agreed to decide whether state employees
are protected by the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
The justices said they will use the case of
two Alabama state employees to decide
whether Congress exceeded its power by giving
state employees the right to sue in federal court
under the ADA.
The court's decision, expected sometime in
2001, could sweep broadly enough to affect all
ADA lawsuits against state governments, not
just those filed by public employees.
Building on a series of decisions legal
scholars say comprise a states' rights revolution,
the Supreme Court in January barred state
employees from going into federal court to sue
over age bias.
That 5-4 ruling said Congress had exceeded
its authority when allowing state employees to
sue their bosses under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act because the law cannot
trump states' 11th Amendment immunity
against being sued in federal courts.
The justices then agreed to tackle cases
from Arkansas and Florida asking them to
decide whether Congress likewise exceeded its
authority when allowing lawsuits against states
under the disabilities law. Both of those cases
were settled thereafter, forcing the court to
drop them from its decision docket.
In the Alabama case, Patricia Garrett sued
the state after allegedly encountering on-the-job
bias at the University of Alabama after being
treated for breast cancer. And Milton Ash sued
over alleged bias in his Department of Youth
Services job because of his severe asthma.
A federal judge, after combining the two
cases, dismissed them on 11th Amendment
grounds. But the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated them, ruling that states have
lost their constitutional immunity from lawsuits
that invoke the ADA.
Federal appeals courts have split on that
issue, however.
Alabama's appeal relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's ruling in the age-bias case and
contended that Congress similarly had failed to
establish a "pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct by the states" that
needed some remedy when it enacted the ADA
in 1990.
Clinton administration lawyers urged the
justices to grant Alabama's appeal and uphold
Congress' power to strip states of their
immunity against claims of bias based on
disabilities.
Garrett had been a University of Alabama
employee for 17 years when in 1994 she was
diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a
lumpectomy, radiation and chemotherapy
treatment.
Her lawsuit said her supervisor made
negative comments about her illness and said
she would be permanently replaced if she took
leave. After Garrett took four months of
unpaid leave, she was demoted to a job with a
lower salary.
Ash's lawsuit said he was the target of
on-the-job discrimination after complaining to
a federal agency about his state employer's
failure to accommodate his respiratory
disability. Ash has worked for the Department
of Youth services since 1993.
Two provisions of the ADA are at stake in
the case. The law's Title I bars discrimination
by employers, both private and public. And
Title II outlaws disabilities-based discrimination
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against anyone by governmental
entities.
The case is University of Alabama vs.
Garrett, 99-1240.
Copyright C 2000 The Associated Press
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JUSTICES TO ACT IN DISPUTE OVER STATES' RIGHTS
Financial Times (London)
Tuesday, April 18, 2000
Patti Waldrneir
The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday agreed
to step in to referee an important states' rights
dispute, in the wake of several controversial
decisions from the highest court which have
significantly extended the immunity of state
governments from lawsuits.
The court yesterday said it would decide
whether state employers were shielded from
lawsuits under federal disabilities law. The
justices have already barred claims of age bias,
patent infringement, unfair trade practices and
wage violations against the states, basing their
rulings on the doctrine of state sovereignty
which largely guarantees states immunity from
suits brought under federal law.
The issue of state sovereign immunity has
provoked fierce criticism, especially from
intellectual property owners who stand to lose
millions of dollars if state universities and other
state entities infringe their patent and other
intellectual property rights, and cannot be
stopped from doing so by federal courts which
enforce such rights.
Legislation has been introduced in
Congress to ensure states cannot escape
lawsuits in the area of intellectual property
rights.
Disability groups, which are far less well
funded than the intellectual property lobby, are
fighting the extension of states' immunity to
disability law, with lower courts split over the
issue.
The supreme court has agreed to step into
the controversy by hearing a pair of cases in
which Alabama workers are claiming protection
under the federal Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which compels employers to
accommodate disabled people so that they can
hold down jobs.
The question for the court is whether
Congress has the constitutional authority to
subject states to lawsuits if they do not abide by
that standard.
In one of the cases the high court will
consider, Patricia Garrett says she was demoted
from her position as a nursing director at the
University of Alabama at Birmingham after she
took a leave of absence to get treatment for
breast cancer.
In the second case, Milton Ash, a security
officer, says his state employer failed to
accommodate his asthma by neglecting to
enforce its no-smoking policy in the gatehouse
where he worked.
The 14th amendment gives Congress the
power to protect people from racial
discrimination or bias based on sex or religious
beliefs. Lawmakers invoked the constitutional
provision to shield disabled Americans from
unfair treatment when it crafted the ADA and
specifically said states could be sued under the
statute.
But Bill Pryor, Alabama attorney-general,
said Congress exceeded its authority when it
subjected states to disability bias suits. He said
lawmakers were looking to cure a problem that
did not exist.
The Justice Department said in a brief filed
in a related case that Congress was on solid
footing when it enacted the statute, stating that
discrimination against disabled people "is
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sufficiently entrenched and widespread to
require a national response".
Rebuff over tobacco adverts
The US supreme court yesterday rejected
challenges, mainly by advertising groups, to the
imposition of bans in New York City and
Chicago on most outdoor and some indoor
tobacco advertising, agencies report from
Washington.
The court, without comment or dissent,
turned away advertisers' arguments that a
federal law pre-empted cities from imposing
their own restrictions.
Advertisers had sued New York City and
Chicago, and in each case a federal judge
decided restrictions were pre-empted by a 1969
federal law that requires health warning labels
on cigarette packages and bars broadcast
cigarette advertising.
The appeals courts ordered the trial judges
to consider the advertisers' argument that the
ordinances violated their constitutional free-
speech rights.
In the appeals acted on yesterday, the
advertisers' lawyers said the 1969 law was
written broadly enough to pre-empt local rules
on outdoor cigarette advertising. The cities'
lawyers said the appeals were premature
because trial judges had not yet considered the
free-speech question.
Copyright D 2000 The Financial Times Limited
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SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER PUBLIC COLLEGES
MAY BE SUED UNDER DISABILITIES LAW
Chronicle ofHigher Education
Friday, April 28,2000
Peter Schnidt
THE U. S. Supreme Court announced last
week that it will decide whether public colleges
and other state agencies can be sued in federal
court under the Americans With Disabilities
Act.
If the Supreme Court accepts arguments that
the 1990 federal disabilities law infringes on
states' rights, public-college employees and
students with physical or mental impairments
could be precluded from suing their institutions
for damages under the A.D.A.
The case before the justices involves two
lawsuits, filed by Alabama state employees,
which a lower federal court had consolidated.
One of the complaints was brought by a
University of Alabama employee who charged
that her supervisors had discriminated against
her after she developed cancer. The plaintiff in
the other lawsuit is a state correctional officer.
The Supreme Court agreed to take up the
question of whether the 11th Amendment to
the U. S. Constitution, which grants states
broad protections against being sued in federal
court, shields states from lawsuits filed under
the federal disabilities act.
EQUAL-PROTECTION GUARANTEES
The lawyers for the state employees argue that
such states rights' concerns are trumped by the
14th Amendment's equal-protection guarantees.
The Supreme Court historically has cited the
14' Amendment in allowing the U. S.
government to enforce state compliance with
federal laws banning racial discrimination. The
two sides in the case disagree on whether the
government's interest in prohibiting
discrimination against people with disabilities is
compelling enough to justify similar intrusions
into states' affairs.
Similar questions have arisen over federal laws
barring discrimination based on age. On that
front, the Supreme Court has come down
squarely on the side of the states.
In January, in a case involving several Florida
public-university employees, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had exceeded its
authority in passing the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
and that state agencies therefore cannot be sued
for alleged age-related bias in federal Court.
DIVIDED APPEALS COURTS
The Supreme Court has tried twice before to
decide the constitutionality of applying the
Americans With Disabilities Act to state
institutions, by agreeing in January to take up
separate lawsuits involving enforcement of the
act in Arkansas and Florida. Both cases were
subsequently settled, however, before the
Supreme Court could render a decision.
In the Alabama case, the university employee
and the corrections officer accused the state
and its university system of violating both the
A.D.A. and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which bars recipients of federal funds-including
colleges-from discriminating on the basis of
disability. A U. S. District Court ruled in
January 1998 that the 11th Amendment
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precluded the lawsuits. The U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ilth Circuit overturned that
decision in October 1999, however.
The State of Alabama and the University of
Alabama System were joined by the plaintiffs
and the U. S. Justice Department in submitting
briefs asking the Supreme Court to resolve the
conflict between the 11th Amendment and the
Americans With Disabilities Act. The Supreme
C6urt needed to intervene, they said, because
the federal circuit courts were deeply divided
over whether states must comply with the act,
with judges in six circuits saying yes, and those
in two circuits ruling no.
The lawyers for the state and the university
system also asked the Supreme Court to decide
whether the 11th Amendment provides states
with immunity from the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.
The lawyers for the plaintiffs and federal
government opposed such a review, however.
They are arguing that the circuit courts were in
agreement that states can be sued under the
Rehabilitation Act, given that the act requires
states to waive their 11th-Amendment
immunity as a condition for receiving federal
funds. On this issue, the Supreme Court sided
with the plaintiffs and federal government and
decided not to review the 11th Circuit's
decision upholding the Rehabilitation Act.
The lawsuit against the University of Alabama
was brought in 1997 by Patricia Garrett, the
director of nursing for women at the University
of Alabama Hospital. She charged that, after
she was diagnosed with breast cancer in 1994,
her supervisor made negative comments about
her illness and demoted her when she took four
months of unpaid leave for treatment.
The university system has denied
discriminating against Ms. Garrett.
Copyright ( 2000 The Chronicle of Higher
Education
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SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY v. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS
Is it a waste of time to mess with the government?
David P. Primack*
The Supreme Court will be getting its hands dirty again in its continuing analysis of the
congressional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. This fall, the Court will determine
whether or not the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers exceeded its jurisdiction when it denied permits to
the Solid Waste Agency if Northern Cook County (SWANCC) to build a landfill because such a landfill
would upset the habitats of certain protected migratory birds. Given this Court's line of decisions from
United States v. Loper (1995) to Bronkala v. Morison (2000), the birds are going to have to show that they
are sufficiently connected with interstate commerce to keep their seasonal home away from home from
being a dumpsite.
For fourteen years, a group of Illinois municipalities have been attempting to find a place where
they can dump their accumulating trash. This consortium, SWANCC, bought a 533-acre parcel of land
just northwest of Chicago which was once a strip mine. SWANCC wanted to make approximately 410
acres of the site a "balefill"-a place where trash is collected into bales before it is eventually dumped.
In order to accomplish this, approximately 17 acres of this area had to be filled up with dirt because
these acres, which were once depressions from the strip mining, had now become ponds and small
lakes unusable for balefilling. These small ponds and lakes are the cause of this whole controversy.
When SWANCC applied for permission to make a balefill, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps"), after having learned that many endangered birds had been observed wading in these pools,
denied SWANCC the permits citing jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule of the Clean Water Act.
SWANCC argued that this rule did not apply to these isolated, intrastate ponds and thus the Clean
Water Act empowered by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution was not controlling. The
district court disagreed with SWANCC's argument and upheld instead the Corps jurisdiction over the
matter.
Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, upheld the lower court's decision. The Seventh
Circuit first noted that the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of fill material into "the navigable
waters" without a permit issued by the Corps. Navigable waters are defined in the statute as the
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) promulgated regulations defining these waters to include "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams ...the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." Finally, in the
apex of this line of reasoning, the Seventh Court noted that the EPA and Corps have long held that this
provision includes all waters otherwise unrelated to interstate commerce "which are or would be used
as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties or which are or would be used as habitat by
other migratory birds which cross state lines."
In its brief, SWANCC argued that the migratory bird rule is unconstitutional in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopeg (1995). In that case, the Court determined that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibits an individual's possession of a firearm in a school
zone, exceeds the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause because the possession of a gun
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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does not substantially affect interstate economic activity. Likewise, SWANCC argued that filling these
17 acres would not substantially affect interstate economic activity. The Seventh Circuit disagreed.
Prior to Lope., it was established that the Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause were
broad enough to permit regulation of the waters based on the presence of migratory birds. Under one
of the three tests of Lope-, a federal statute based on the Commerce Clause must regulate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. SWANCC tried to assert that the migratory bird rule does not
meet this test, but the Seventh Court noted that Lopez in no way undermined the cumulative impact
doctrine-a single activity that itself has no discernable effect on interstate commerce may still be
regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
In this case, the destruction of migratory bird habitats and the corollary decrease in bird populations
substantially affects the billion-dollar industry spent in hunting, trapping, or observing migratory birds.
The effect of the destruction of one intrastate pond on birds may not be noticeable but the aggregate
effect is clear that if migratory birds' habitats were destroyed, this industry and those birds would be
substantially affected.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed two obvious questions. Despite SWANCC's argument to
the contrary, not every puddle of water would be protected under the migratory bird rule; only those
waters that serve as actual habitats for migratory birds could be considered as protected. This site is the
seasonal home to the second largest breeding ground for the great blue heron, a protected bird.
Secondly, although SWANCC points out that LopeZ stresses that legislation should not erode the
distinctions between what is truly national and truly local, migratory birds are indeed a national, nay
even, international concern as evidenced by the numerous national and international treaties and
conventions that govern their activities.
Solid Waste Ageny will provide the Supreme Court with another opportunity to delineate the
extent of Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. From Lope. to Bronkala it appears
that the court has asked for a closer nexus between legislation and economic activity than it has in the
past. Given this, the Corps will probably have the burden to show that these isolated, seasonal pools of
water part and parcel of the greater economic migratory bird activities. In any case, it is clear that the
Corps will be wading into now muddied waters of the scope of the Commerce power.
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99-1178 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers
Ruling below (7Th Cir., 191 F.3d 845, 68 U.S.L.W. 1216, 49 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1353):
Army Corps of Engineers' assertion of Clean Water Act jurisdiction over intrastate waters shown to
provide habitat for migratory birds is permissible exercise of Congress's authority under commerce
clause to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Question presented: May U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, consistent with Clean Water Act and
commerce clause of U.S. Constitution, assert jurisdiction over isolated intrastate waters solely because
those waters do or potentially could serve as habitat of migratory birds?
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SOLID WASTE AGENCY of Northern Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
United States ARMY CORPS of Engineers, Defendants-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided October 7, 1999
WOOD, Circuit Judge
This case involves the efforts of a
consortium of Illinois municipalities to find a
place to dump their trash. The Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC")
thought that it had found such a spot in a 533-
acre parcel of land straddling Cook and Kane
Counties, Illinois. Before its "balefill" could
open, however, approximately 17.6 acres of
ponds and small lakes located on the parcel had
to be filled in. This case presents the question
whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("the
Corps"), acting under 5 404 of the Clean Water
Act ("the Act"), 33 U.S.C. f 1344, had
jurisdiction to require SWANCC to obtain a
permit for its fill operations. SWANCC initially
applied for such a permit, but the Corps denied
it. SWANCC then sued, claiming both that the
Corps had no business meddling in the matter at
all and that it was wrong on the merits. For its
part, the Corps claimed jurisdiction under the so-
called "migratory bird rule," which interprets the
Act as extending to certain intrastate waters
based on their actual or potential use as habitat
for migratory birds. (The parties dispute whether
this is a mere interpretation of statutory language,
or something that should be regarded as a
freestanding rule--a point that we discuss later in
this opinion. Our use of the common phrase
"migratory bird rule" is not intended to suggest a
position on that issue.)
The district court granted summary judgment
in the Corps' favor on the jurisdictional point. At
that point, SWANCC decided voluntarily to
dismiss the remainder of its claims, so that the
district court could enter a final judgment from
which it could appeal. *** We conclude that the
Corps properly asserted jurisdiction in this
matter, and we therefore affirm.
I
SWANCC is a group of 23 municipalities
that banded together to form a municipal
corporation for the purpose of locating and
developing a disposal site for nonhazardous
waste. It found and purchased the 533-acre site
to which we have already referred, from which it
hoped to carve out approximately 410 acres for a
"balefill"-- that is, a landfill where the waste is
baled before it is dumped. Approximately 298
acres of the proposed balefill site is what is
known as an early successional stage forest. At
one time, it was a strip mine, but when the
mining operation shut down approximately 50
years ago, a labyrinth of trenches and other
depressions remained behind. Over time, the
land evolved into an attractive woodland
vegetated by approximately 170 different species
of plants. What were once gravel pits are now
over 200 permanent and seasonal ponds. These
ponds range from less than one-tenth of an acre
to several acres in size, and from several inches
to several feet in depth. The forest is also home
to a variety of small animals. Most important for
our purposes are the 100-plus species of birds
that have been observed there. These include
many endangered, water-dependent, and
migratory birds. Among the species that have
been seen nesting, feeding, or breeding at the site
are mallard ducks, wood ducks, Canada geese,
sandpipers, kingfishers, water thrushes, swamp
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swallows, red-winged blackbirds, tree swallows,
and several varieties of herons. Most notably, the
site is a seasonal home to the second-largest
breeding colony of great blue herons in
northeastern Illinois, with approximately 192
nests in 1993.
This litigation arose because the proposed
balefill project would require the filling of
approximately 17.6 acres of semi-aquatic
property within the forested area. Section 404 of
the Act prohibits the discharge of fill material
into "the navigable waters" without a permit
issued by the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers. *** The term
"navigable waters" is defined in the statute as
"the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." *** Although the Act itself
provides no further explanation of which waters
are subject to § 404's requirements, regulations
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the Corps define the phrase "waters
of the United States" to include "intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce." ***
In March 1986, SWANCC contacted the
Corps to find out if a particular 267-acre parcel
within the proposed balefill site included
"wetlands" within the meaning of the Act, such
that SWANCC would have to obtain a §404
permit in order to fill it in. After an on-site
inspection, the Corps initially decided that the
site did not include protected wetlands and
therefore did not fall within its regulatory
jurisdiction. One year later, in February 1987,
SWANCC contacted the Corps to request a
determination as to whether a 414-acre parcel of
the site included "wetlands." The Corps again
responded in the negative.
The Corps changed its position with regard
to its jurisdiction over the balefill site, however,
after the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission (a
state agency) informed it that a number of
migratory bird species had been observed there.
This new information made all the difference to
the Corps, because of the so-called migratory
bird rule. This rule, or interpretive convention,
reflects the fact that the definition of "waters of
the United States" found in 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3) has long been understood by the EPA
and the Corps to include all waters, including
those otherwise unrelated to interstate
commerce, "which are or would be used as
habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties" or "which are or would be used as
habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines." *** ("1986 preamble"). In a letter to
SWANCC dated November 16, 1987, the Corps
explained that its two previous determinations
that the site did not fall within its jurisdiction
were based on its finding that the site did not
meet the definition of "wetland." In contrast, the
latest determination-that the Corps did have
jurisdiction over the site--was based on a
different theory entirely. Regardless of wetland
status, it now appeared that the aquatic areas of
the site "are or could be used as habitat by
migratory birds which cross state lines." In
response to the Corps' notification that it
intended to exercise jurisdiction over the site,
SWANCC submitted an application for a §404
permit. The Corps denied that application,
finding that all of the affected waters in the site
were in fact used as habitat by migratory birds
(and thus were not merely potential habitat).
SWANCC then submitted a revised application
that was also denied.
At this stage in the litigation, SWANCC has
abandoned its challenge to the merits of the
Corps' decisions and has instead focused
exclusively on its challenge to the migratory bird
rule as a basis for the Corps' jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we accept as true the Corps' factual
findings with regard to SWANCC's permit
application, including the crucial finding that the
waters of this site were a habitat for migratory
birds.
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II
SWANCC offers three arguments to support
its position that the Corps had no authority to
require it to obtain a permit: (1) Congress lacked
the power to grant the Corps regulatory
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters based
on the presence of migratory birds alone; (2) the
Corps exceeded its statutory authority in
interpreting the Act to confer jurisdiction as
provided by the migratory bird rule; and (3) the
migratory bird rule is invalid because it was not
promulgated in accordance with the notice and
comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") ***
We begin with the most ambitious of
SWANCC's arguments, which is that the
migratory bird rule is unconstitutional in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lope7, *** Prior to Lopez, it had been established
that Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause were broad enough to permit regulation
of waters based on the presence of migratory
birds. *** We must decide whether Lopez now
compels the opposite conclusion.
In Lope,-,, the Court reaffirmed the well-
established principle that a federal statute based
on the Commerce Clause must serve one of
three purposes: (1) regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) regulation or protection
of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce; or
(3) regulation of activities that "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. Lope!, 514 U.S. at
558-59; *** The gun control law at issue in Lope<,
like the migratory bird rule challenged here,
could only have been sustained as an exercise of
the third variety of regulatory power. The Lopez
Court concluded that the statute before it, which
made it a crime "knowingly ... [to] possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone"
did not meet the "substantially affects" test
because (1) it was a criminal statute which, by its
terms, had nothing to do with interstate
commerce or commercial transactions; (2) it
contained no jurisdictional element to ensure that
in each case the firearm in question had in fact
affected interstate commerce; and (3) Congress
had offered no legislative findings to support the
conclusion that possessing a gun in a school zone
affected interstate commerce. Lope,-, 514 U.S. at
559-62; ***
SWANCC urges us to conclude that the
migratory bird rule suffers from the same
defects. But such a conclusion would overlook
important differences between the statute before
the Court in Lopez and the one we are
considering. This court has noted previously that
LopeZ expressly recognized, and in no way
disapproved, the cumulative impact doctrine,
under which a single activity that itself has no
discernible effect on interstate commerce may
still be regulated if the aggregate effect of that
class of activity has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce. ***
This approach, which is most closely
associated with the Supreme Court's decision in
Wickard v. Filburn, *** indicates the relevant legal
question for our case is whether the destruction
of the natural habitat of migratory birds in the
aggregate "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. We observed in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
EPA, *** that "throughout North America,
millions of people annually spend more than a
billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and
observing migratory birds. Yet the cumulative
loss of wetlands has reduced the populations of
many species and consequently the ability of
people to hunt, trap, and observe those birds."
*** Statistics produced by the U.S. Census
Bureau reveal that approximately 3.1 million
Americans spent $ 1.3 billion to hunt migratory
birds in 1996, and that about 11 percent of them
traveled across state lines to do so. Fish &
Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior &
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
1996 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and
Wildlife-Associated Recreation 25 (November
1997). Another 17.7 million people spent time
observing birds in states other than their states of
residence; 14.3 million of these took trips
specifically for this purpose; and approximately
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9.5 million traveled for the purpose of observing
shorebirds, such as herons *** There is no need
to dally on this point: we find (once again) that
the destruction of migratory bird habitat and the
attendant decrease in the populations of these
birds "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
The effect may not be observable as each isolated
pond used by the birds for feeding, nesting, and
breeding is filled, but the aggregate effect is clear,
and that is all the Commerce Clause requires.
SWANCC objects that the migratory bird
rule cannot serve to define the Corps'
jurisdiction, because the rule excludes nothing.
The United States is home to somewhere
between 2.5 and 6 billion birds, two-thirds of
which migrate. Virtually any body of water could
serve as a temporary habitat for at least some of
these birds. However, any suggestion that next
the Corps will be trying to regulate the filling of
every puddle that forms after a rainstorm, at least
if a bird is seen splashing in it, misses the point.
A "habitat" is not simply a place where a bird
might alight for a few minutes, as SWANCC
suggests, but rather "the place where a plant or
animal species naturally lives or grows."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1017 (1993). Before the Corps may assert
jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule, it must
first make a factual determination that a
particular body of water provides a habitat for
migratory birds, which it has done here.
Last, SWANCC offers a broad policy-based
argument for rejecting jurisdiction under the
migratory bird rule. The rule is, it claims,
inconsistent with the principles of federalism that
motivated the Court in Lope , because it erodes
the "distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local." *** But this argument
works only if, as SWANCC asserts, the
protection of migratory bird habitat is a matter of
local concern only. Once again, that argument is
refuted by the numerous international treaties
and conventions designed to protect migratory
birds, *** as well as the case law recognizing the
"national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude" in protecting such birds ***. Even
less persuasive is SWANCC's suggestion that
giving a federal agency (here, the Corps) the
power to override decisions by local land use
and zoning boards to permit the filling of local
waters conflicts with notions of state sovereignty.
To the contrary, because the regulation of
migratory bird habitat is a permissible exercise of
Congress' authority, the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2., squarely supports the
legitimacy of giving precedence to federal law in
this area.
III
SWANCC next contends that, even if
Congress lawfully could have granted the Corps
jurisdiction over isolated bodies of water based
on the presence of migratory birds, it did not do
so. As noted above, the Act expressly limits the
Corps' jurisdiction to "the waters of the United
States." The EPA and the Corps have defined
this term to include "all other waters ... the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce." They further
have interpreted the phrase "could affect
interstate or foreign commerce" as permitting
jurisdiction based on the presence of migratory
birds. It is this second level of agency
interpretation that SWANCC deems excessive.
We review an agency's interpretation of a
statute it is charged with administering under the
standard outlined in Chevrn U.SA. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counil, Inc. *** The first question
is whether the plain meaning of the text of the
statute either supports or opposes the regulation.
If so, the analysis ends with the court's
application of the plain meaning. *** But if the
statute is either ambiguous or silent on the issue,
the court must defer to the agency interpretation
so long as it is based on a reasonable reading of
the statute. ***
It is well established that the geographical
scope of the Act reaches as many waters as the
Commerce Clause allows. *** Thus, if Congress
possesses the power to regulate a body of water
under the Act, generally this court will conclude
378
that it has in fact done so. Accordingly, because
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is
broad enough to permit regulation of waters
based on the presence of migratory birds, it is
certainly reasonable for the EPA and the Corps
to interpret the Act in such a manner. ***
SWANCC believes that this conclusion is at
odds with the Fourth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Wilson, *** Wilson involved a challenge
to 33 C.F.R. 5 328(a)(3), the regulation that
defines "waters of the United States" to include
all waters "the use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce." The court found the regulation to be
an unreasonable interpretation of the Act based
on its suspicion that Congress lacks the power
to regulate waters that "could" affect interstate or
foreign commerce. In our case, however, the
question whether Congress may regulate waters
based on their potential to affect interstate
commerce is not presented, because the
unchallenged facts show that the filling of the
17.6 acres would have an immediate effect on
migratory birds that actually use the area as a
habitat. Thus, we need not, and do not, reach the
question of the Corps' jurisdiction over areas that
are only potential habitats. Moreover, we note
that SWANCC has not attacked 33 C.F.R. §
328(a)(3) here. Instead, it has limited its
objections to the propriety of the migratory bird
rule as an interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3).
SWANCC's remaining statutory
interpretation argument asks us to find the
migratory bird rule unreasonable because it is
designed to preserve wildlife rather than water
quality. This point overlooks the fact that the
Act's stated purpose is "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters." *** SWANCC's suggestion
that the Corps' jurisdiction must be defined
solely by reference to water quality is itself
inconsistent with the Act and must be rejected.
IV
Last, SWANCC challenges the migratory bird
rule on the ground that it was promulgated in
violation of the notice and comment
requirements of the APA. *** Our starting point
here is with the fact that the APA does not
require administrative agencies to follow notice
and comment procedures in all situations.
Section 553(b)(3)(a) specifically exempts
"interpretive rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" from the requirement. In order to
succeed on its APA claim, then, SWANCC must
convince us that the migratory bird rule is a
legislative (also termed "substantive") rule, rather
than an interpretive rule or policy statement. ***
That, in our view, it cannot do. We explained
the difference between legislative and interpretive
rules at some length in Hoctor v. U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture, *** where we found that a rule
requiring certain wild animal containment fences
to be eight feet tall was legislative. The reason for
this was straightforward: nothing in the idea of a
"secure" containment could tell someone
whether 7 feet, 8 feet, or 8 feet, would be
"secure" enough. The statute in question (the
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C J 2131 et seq.) did
not impose a duty to build a fence of a certain
height. Instead, it authorized the agency to
impose a specific obligation that would
implement the general statutory goals. Here, the
statute itself defines the jurisdictional reach of
the Act, and regulations issued under the notice-
and-comment procedures have elaborated
further upon that definition. There is, following
Hoctor's common-sense approach, something to
interpret here: the use of the term "waters" and
"navigable waters" in 33 U.S.C. f f 1344(a) and
1362(7), and the specific examples of such waters
given in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
It is also noteworthy that the migratory bird
"rule" first made its appearance in the Federal
Register publication of the Corps' 1986
recodification of the regulatory definition of
"waters of the United States" in 33 C.F.R. §
328(a)(3), when it moved these rules from Part
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323 to Part 328 of Title 33 of the Code. *** The
preamble offered several examples of waters that
came within the regulatory definition, including
those used as habitat for migratory birds, as well
as examples of waters that normally would not
fall within the definition. This, in our view, was
interpretation. Moreover, it is hard to see what
would have been different if formal notice-and-
comment rulemaking had been used, except
perhaps the page of the Federal Register on
which this statement appeared. We do not wish
to discourage agencies from offering concrete
examples of the ways in which their rules will
apply, *** and we believe that is all that the
Corps and the EPA did here.
The Corps has also argued that SWANCC's
challenge to the migratory bird rule comes too
late, because SWANCC did not file suit in the
district court until December 1994, more than six
years after the migratory bird rule was first
published. There is a general six-year statute of
limitations for civil actions against the United
States found in 28 U.S.C J 2401(a), which
applies to lawsuits brought pursuant to the APA.
*** Even if the fact that the Corps did not raise
this argument in the district court does not bar it
now from making the argument, we doubt that a
party must (or even may) bring an action under
the APA before it knows that a regulation may
injure it or even be applied to it. *** We
therefore do not reach the Corps' limitations
argument, since it would have no effect on the
outcome in light of our resolution of SWANCC's
substantive APA challenge.
We conclude that the decision to regulate
isolated waters based on their actual use as
habitat by migratory birds is within Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, and that it
was reasonable for the Corps to interpret the Act
as authorizing this regulation. Accordingly, we
Affirm the judgment of the district court.
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THE COURT'S NEXT CHAPTER
The Washington Post
Wednesday, june 7,2000
THE SUPREME Court has wasted no time
teeing up another round in its exploration of
the limits of federal power. Within a week of
striking down portions of the Violence Against
Women Act, the justices agreed to hear a
challenge to the government's authority to
protect small wetlands that are home to
migratory birds. The court's conservative
majority seeks to prevent federal intrusions into
areas of traditional state concern. That's a
useful instinct up to a point. But if it were to go
too far, the court would undercut Congress's
ability to perform essential national functions.
Environmental protection is one such. The case
of Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers presents a good opportunity for the
court to start drawing some difficult lines.
The technical issue in all these cases is the
scope of Congress's power under the
Constitution to regulate interstate commerce.
The commerce clause has in recent decades
been broadly interpreted and has provided the
basis for a great deal of congressional action,
including to safeguard civil rights. Starting with
the 1995 case of U.S. v. Lopez, however, the
court began stressing that even the commerce
clause power has limits. In the Lopez case,
involving the use of guns near schools, and
again recently in the violence-against-women
case, the court struck down congressional
efforts to regulate non-economic activities that
take place within a single state. These decisions
seem reasonable, but they beg the question of
how to define economic activity so as not to
preclude federal action where it has come to be
expected.
In the current case, the Army Corps of
Engineers blocked some Illinois municipalities
from filling in wetlands to create a garbage
dump. The communities sued, claiming that
such regulation is not a valid exercise of the
commerce clause power. Their argument has a
certain plausibility in the wake of the court's
recent decision. The wetlands in question are all
within a single state, and protecting migratory
birds from extinction has only obliquely to do
with commerce.
But such federal environmental protection
ought to be on safe ground. In striking down
the provision of the Violence Against Women
Act that allowed civil suits in federal court for
rape victims, the court stressed that gender-
motivated violence was in no sense economic
activity. That's not true of solid waste disposal.
That alone should permit federal jurisdiction.
And though environmental laws will sometimes
restrict non-economic conduct, they are
generally aimed at preventing commercial or
industrial activities from adversely affecting the
environment. The courts must give Congress
latitude to pass such general regulatory regimes
aimed at economic behaviors that impinge on
other national interests. The conservative 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday used this
logic to uphold a federal regulation protecting
the red wolf, noting that blocking such federal
environmental protection would "transform the
[courts'] reviewing function from a shield
protecting state activities into a sword
dismembering a long recognized federal one."
If the courts do not show deference to
Congress here, they risk calling into question
not just environmental laws but civil rights and
other statutes as well.
Liberals have been quick to denounce the
Supreme Court's interest in reexamining the
commerce clause. So far, the court majority has
thrown out relatively marginal laws that were
important principally as symbols. If Congress
has to think twice before passing such statutes
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in the future, the system will be the healthier.
With this case, however, we will learn whether
the justices will content themselves with
teaching this important civics lesson or whether
they mean to prove the alarmists correct.
Copyright © 2000 The Washington Post
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COURT STUDIES CORPS' REVIEW
Waste News
Monday, June 5, 2000
Susanna Duff
The Supreme Court will decide whether the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction
to deny landfill development in a migratory bird
area.
Broadly, the court's decision would
determine the constitutional boundaries of the
Commerce Clause, but it also would directly
impact development of landfills in isolated
bodies of water.
The court agreed May 24 to consider a case
brought by the Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County, Ill., which claims the
Corps for more than a decade has illegally
blocked the development of a landfill in
northern Illinois.
The Corps holds that under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, it can require SWANCC
to obtain a permit because the site, a former
strip mine, is home to migratory birds. Section
404 requires a landfill permit for disposal into
"navigable waters," ambiguously defined as
"waters of the United States." The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency further
defines that to include waters that could affect
interstate commerce.
SWANCC argues the Corps has
overstepped its jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause. Last October, the U.S. 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 1994
decision by an Illinois federal court siding with
the Corps.
The Supreme Court's decision, expected
next spring, would clarify its increasingly
restrictive position on congressional authority
of the Commerce Clause, said Kenneth
Kaufman, a Washington environmental lawyer.
In a 1995 case involving guns and schools, the
Supreme Court ruled Congress had to justify its
legislative action under the Commerce Clause.
Last month, the court struck down a violence
against women law, stating Congress must
show a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
If the court restricts the Corps' authority,
more landfill operators than the SWANCC
would win. Developers of landfills in isolated
bodies of water would not have to deal with
permits from the Corps or the EPA, which
sometimes oversteps Corps authority, Kaufman
said.
"You've got less bureaucracy in that there is
one less entity to deal with," said Kaufman, an
attorney with Wright & Talisman.
A decision favoring SWANCC also would
help landfill operators build on dry washes, or
gullies, which fall under the federal jurisdiction
because of the migratory bird theory, said
Washington environmental lawyer Virginia
Albrecht. "I think it would raise substantial
questions about authority of these dry gullies,
which are sprinkled throughout the West," said
Albrecht, with Hunton & Williams.
Cutting out the Corps would be a time
saver in the often long landfill permitting
process. The 533-acres in question were
purchased 15 years ago for a 410-acre site.
SWANCC planned to carve out 142 acres for a
balefill, a landfill where the waste is baled
before it is dumped.
The Corps twice denied SWANCC a permit
for the landfill, which is home to a 298-acre
forest with 200 permanent and seasonal ponds
visited by more than 100 species of birds. The
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first time, the Corps said SWANCC's plan for
forest birds was inefficient. The second time,
the Corps said the stormwater plan design
would flood the area.
"We saw it as a way to throw multiple ways
of denying a permit," said Brooke Beal,
SWANCC's executive director.
The Corps said it would not comment on
ongoing litigation.
If built, the balefill would accept up to
1,500 tons per day, Beal said. SWANCC
operates a transfer station in nearby Glenview
that takes in more than 1,000 tons of municipal
solid waste from SWANCC's 23 member
communities in northern Cook County
suburbs. The waste is taken across state lines to
a Waste Management landfill in Bristol, Wis.
That made interstate waste a SWANCC
concern, Beal said. Northern Illinois is not
developing any new sites, and Wisconsin has
twice tried to restrict waste from crossing its
borders.
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HIGH COURT TO HEAR CASE ON LANDFILL IN BARTLETT
Chicago Daily Herald
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
Matt Arado
The U.S. Supreme Court Monday set the
stage for what should be the final legal battle in
a 14-year war over a proposed landfill near
Bartlett.
High-court justices announced they will
consider whether the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers overstepped its bounds by stopping
construction of the so-called balefill, which
would use 142 acres of a 410-acre site near the
intersection of West Bartlett and Gifford roads
in Cook County.
The village of Bartlett and nearby residents
have opposed the project, saying it would
devastate the environment and contaminate the
local water supply.
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County claims it is a much-needed solution to
vanishing landfill space and the high cost of
transporting garbage out of state. The
consortium has invested $ 20 million in
taxpayer money on the facility so far.
"We're very excited the court has decided to
hear our case," said agency Executive Director
C. Brooke Beal, whose group disposes waste
from 23 North and Northwest Cook County
communities. "The court hears so few cases,
and we think this indicates that the court thinks
our case has some merit."
The court's decision, Beal added, follows its
recent pattern of tackling cases concerning the
scope of federal authority.
"In recent weeks, (the high court) has ruled
both the Congress and federal agencies have
overstepped their constitutional authority," he
said. "This is part of the argument we have with
the Army Corps of Engineers."
Mary Byrne, a Hanover Park resident who
heads a grass-roots group called Citizens
Against the Balefill, didn't share Beal's
excitement. She and other balefill opponents
thought the project was dead last October
when the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled the Clean Water Act specifically gave the
Army Corps authority to regulate the site.
That site, a former gravel mine, contains
waters that have become home to several
species of migrating birds. The Army Corps
twice refused to grant permits to the waste
agency to protect it.
The proposed project is called a balefill
because workers bale the trash before burying
it.
"Just when you think it's over, you realize
you aren't even out of the tunnel yet," Byrne
said. "I can't understand why the court would
decide to hear this case. We have all the facts
on our side."
Byrne said her group will do whatever it can
to assist the government during the Supreme
Court case. Briefs will be filed as early as this
summer, Beal said, and arguments before the
court eventually will be scheduled. A decision is
likely by next spring.
The solid-waste agency, Beal said, has set
aside about 2 percent of its $ 18 million budget
for the case. Currently, residential waste
handled by the agency gets processed at a
transfer station in Glenview before being
shipped about 40 miles north to a landfill in
Bristol, Wis.
Bartlett Village President Catherine
Melchert said she was confident the high court
would rule in the corps' favor.
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"We've been at this for a long time,"
Melchert said. "Two courts have upheld the
government's position. I don't have any reason
to expect anything different from the Supreme
Court."
Melchert couldn't say what assistance, if
any, Bartlett would lend to the Army Corps in
the case.
"That's something our board has to
discuss," she said.
Leaders from communities disposing trash
through the solid waste agency welcomed a
decision on the landfill.
"I think the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court is willing to hear the case will bring this
to fruition one way or another once and for
all," said Hoffman Estates Mayor Michael
O'Malley.
"All along we've been interested in a
garbage disposal technology that is
environmentally safe and responsible and
addresses the needs of the local community,"
added Mount Prospect Trustee Tim Corcoran.
"This gives us our day in court."
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